Patient consent principles and guidelines for e-consent: a New Zealand perspective
In the health sector, terms such as 'patient consent', 'informed consent', 'implied consent' and 'explicit consent' are used to describe an arrangement between a patient (healthcare consumer) and a physician/hospital (healthcare provider). The term 'patient consent' implies that the patient is willing to share personal health information and, where appropriate, to submit to a course of medical treatment. By extension, 'informed consent' requires that the patient is informed prior to agreement of the reasons behind the request for information, the way that information will be shared among healthcare providers and third parties, and the risks associated with the prescribed medical treatment or clinical trial.
Informed consent is underpinned by three basic principles of bioethics [3] : nonmalfeasance, beneficence (non-maleficence), and autonomy. Non-malfeasance is prohibition of doing harm to a person and is, of course, a key instrument of the Hippocratic oath. In the context of informed consent, deliberately omitting to tell the patient the consequences of their consent or the use to be made of their information would constitute an act of malfeasance. In contrast, beneficence is the act of doing a person some good such as ensuring that consent is truly informed by making available all appropriate information. Finally, autonomy is the right of choice exemplified by the physician informing the patient and then letting him or her make their own decision on consent without due coercion.
The terms 'implied' and 'explicit' denote two different methods of handling patient consent. In many countries, the patient is assumed to give their 'implied consent' when they seek advice, treatment, or other healthcare services. In this case, consent is inferred from the patient's actions assuming that he/she is reasonably aware of the consequences [2] . In contrast, 'explicit consent' or 'express consent' refer to situations in which the healthcare provider must obtain consent in writing, verbally, or by some other acceptable means before personal information is shared or healthcare services are delivered.
Consent and patient control of information
The most important part of consent management in the health sector is how to enforce a patient's desire to control who accesses, uses, and updates his/her information stored within a health information system. The objective of obtaining consent should be to have an early opportunity to discuss a patient's privacy concerns as well as any calls for restricting future access to the patient's information according to his/her wishes [4] .
The action taken to obtain the appropriate level of consent depends upon a fundamental assumption about the extent of access that the patient wishes to exert over their personal information. Common practice recognizes four distinct levels of consent [5] :
Level 1: general consent. This level corresponds to an 'opt-in' model, in which a patient is assumed to give blanket consent to any information request so that no further agreement is necessary either for a new episode of care or for the release of information for any other purpose.
Level 2: general consent with specific exclusions. In this case, a patient accepts a general consent but the permission excludes certain categories of information (e.g. gynaecological or sexual disease information), identified parties (e.g. insurance companies), or disclosure for a particular purpose (e.g. for employment).
Level 3: general denial with specific consents. This situation is the analogue of level 2 except that here the patient denies all access to their health data with the exception of certain categories of information (e.g. demographic details related to a specified medical condition), identified parties (e.g. general practitioner), or disclosure for a particular purpose (e.g. for a prostate cancer survey).
Level 4: general denial. This case equates to an 'opt-out' model in which a patient expressly denies consent for information to be used in future circumstances. Each new episode of care or request to use personal health information therefore requires explicit consent.
Whichever model is adopted, there is an obligation to ensure that consent is 'informed' so that the patient is fully aware of the consequences of an intervention or the purpose of the release of his/her information.
The definitions and the practice described above reveal opportunities for confusion, disagreements and denial over whether consent has been 'informed' or even given, leading perhaps to litigation or, worse still, to medical misadventure. Governments introduce legislation [6] , guidelines and standards [7] and healthcare providers adopt protocols [8] to reduce the incidence of such events. However, legislation and practice often fall behind changing circumstances and technology and this is nowhere more evident than in e-health [9] -the application of information technology to healthcare planning and delivery.
For example, new forms of healthcare service such as telemedicine [10] increase the possibility of security breaches and illegal access to private information. The practice of granting or denying consent to the sharing of personal health information must therefore extend to include remote transmission as well as refer to the transmission of images and text [11, 12] , however the patient's consent is obtained.
Electronic consent systems
It is now common practice for many business and healthcare transactions to be facilitated or mediated electronically. At the lowest level, the technology is applied to automate processes and improve their speed and accuracy. At higher levels, it can assist, although never entirely replace, expert clinical and related decision making [13] .
These considerations are clearly applicable to situations in which a healthcare consumer's agreement on sharing personal health information or receiving healthcare services is obtained or recorded by an electronic information system or database. The consent database could then be used for routine management purposes, e.g. to determine if guidelines are being rigorously followed, or for analysis, e.g. to discover what types of consent are given in different circumstances with a view to improving the privacy and security of personal information.
This type of information system is termed an 'electronic consent' or 'e-consent' system [5, 14, 15] and such systems are attracting the interest of healthcare policy makers and providers in several countries. This interest is due partly to perceived improvements in the quality and efficiency of care, and partly to concerns about the risks to privacy from the electronic collection, storage and transmission of personal information.
Galpottage and Norris Patient consent principles
This article outlines the main features of healthcare consent in an e-health environment. After reviewing international experience in the field, it reports preliminary progress in New Zealand towards the development of a framework for the practical application of e-consent systems.
The characteristics, benefits and limitations of e-consent systems
The opt-in model of level 1 is administratively the simplest model of consent to implement but it also increases the risk of abusing patient trust and may lead patients to withhold information needed for effective treatment for fear that the information will be used carelessly and to their detriment. Neither does this model allow easily for changing circumstances [4] , for example, the patient may suddenly wish to revoke family access to their medical history. An e-consent system has limited application to the level 1 model.
In contrast, the level 4, opt-out model offers maximum safeguards for privacy and confidentiality but is administratively complex since healthcare providers must ask patients for their consent at every decision point. Not only is this time consuming but a patient may also see several different providers over a course of treatment and each care person must be aware of the applicable disclosure rules. An e-consent system, perhaps in the form of a smart card or an interactive networked computer working in real time, can reduce this organizational overhead considerably as well as ensure that carers are alerted to the disclosure regulations and have up-to-date information.
Moreover, wherever explicit consent for treatment or the sharing of information is necessary (levels 2-4), an e-consent system can ensure that all necessary checks have been made in gaining consent as well as simplifying the acquisition and storage of the consent outcome and ensuring its currency and availability to all those involved in the care process. The same system can also test the eligibility of the patient for treatment and the authenticity of the carers.
Over and above these benefits, an e-consent system can be used to inform patients of the consequences of their decision to give permission for treatment or the use of information, or the implications of their refusal to do so. This is an important benefit as the interactive software can be programmed to prevent granting of consent until the patient has acknowledged that they have read and understood the consequences of their decision, giving both patients and carers the security of a legal, documented choice made under controlled, auditable and reproducible conditions [5] .
The same system can also be the portal to the information that the patient agrees to share so that the consent details stored in the system can give clinicians and other authorized personnel access to disclosed information whilst preventing access to information that the patient has not agreed to release.
The characteristics of e-consent systems are therefore:
• protect privacy
• inform patient
• capture consent
• release information.
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These characteristics are important drivers for the development of such systems in modern computer-mediated healthcare. With the patients' agreement they can be used to approve and deny consent for a range of circumstances in advance of any treatment or release of information, thereby reducing or eliminating subsequent requests for consent. This feature is particularly useful in emergency situations [16] when patients may be unconscious or unable to give consent, and in proxy circumstances where consent must be obtained from a patient's family or other approved person. These circumstances might include the care of minors, intellectually disabled persons, elderly patients and drug abusers, surgery, organ donation and related end-of-life decisions. There is much debate [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] surrounding the ethics of proxy decision making, and e-consent systems may have a role in providing advice on care outcomes and information sharing that can help to achieve consistency in a sensitive and difficult area.
The limitations of an e-consent system cannot be fully known as no such system has been fully implemented in any nation's public health sector. Cost will be a consideration but the reduction of risk and medical error, and the potential increase in quality of care, should outweigh this concern in the medium or long term. Patient acceptability and the management of consent may prove to be more problematic issues since, as noted, an e-consent system operates most effectively with competent individuals in a measured, controlled environment.
International developments in e-consent
Although commercial technologies for explicit e-consent systems are not presently available, public health sectors in several countries have initiated projects to develop their own e-consent systems. These developments are often in countries with ongoing e-health initiatives that form part of long-term strategies to develop integrated electronic health systems with lifetime electronic health records (EHRs) as their centrepiece. Unfortunately, however, issues like consent, privacy and security are usually considered after the launch of the e-health strategies and they are either poorly considered and incomplete afterthoughts or badly implemented additions.
Here we summarize some of the best-reported and more advanced examples from the USA, Australia and the UK before we look at developments in New Zealand.
USA
The USA, under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, was moving forward with strategic guidance for an explicit consent system according to the Department of Health and Human Services 1 (DHHS) report Summary of HIPAA Final Privacy Rule [22] when the current administration removed the requirement, citing administrative burden and increased costs on healthcare providers [23] . The revised HIPAA regulations now require that healthcare providers only inform patients about the potential uses of their health information and of the users who may access that information.
Hence, the USA now has an implicit consent system where the healthcare provider only has to inform the consumer about the risks associated with any treatment or the way his/her information may be used [23] . The change in intent has caused worries among healthcare consumers, and consumer organizations have filed a lawsuit against the Galpottage and Norris Patient consent principles modification, citing inappropriate access to personal health information as a result of the patient not having direct control over his/her personal health information [24] . This has already resulted in patients being more wary of the information they give to their healthcare provider.
This situation is somewhat similar to the implied consent practice current in New Zealand, except that Dovey and Tilyard [25] contend that the informing aspect of consent in relation to sharing personal information is not vital in New Zealand.
While the USA has avoided legislation advocating the rights of healthcare consumers to make informed decisions and give consent at present, Australia and the UK have such legislation in place and these countries are embarking on e-consent system projects to reduce the administrative burden and costs associated with managing consent. Canada also has an explicit consent system under their legislation and regulations but there is no intention to build an e-consent system.
Australia
A summary of the final reports from several Australian electronic patient consent projects is discussed in an Australian Federal Department of Health and Aged Care (DHAC) report published in 2002 [26] . The projects were initiated as part of the strategic goal of achieving improved integration and coordination of healthcare delivery in Australia. Underlying all of these projects was the principle that any solution for the management of electronic consent must provide the same level of confidentiality as existing paper-based practices.
The DHAC, which backed all of these projects, looked at whether confidentiality would be ensured, the technology issues associated with ownership of intellectual property, and also the development of a framework that facilitates the adoption of an 'electronic consent object' [26] . The major issues identified in the report were the type of framework suitable for electronic consent management and the infrastructure assumptions required for such consent initiatives.
Australia already has a portal called 'Gatekeeper' based on public key encryption technology for government to secure electronic information exchange [27] . Also, all future health information will be communicated over an integrated health information network called 'HealthConnect' [28] . A software-based add-on to the EHR as an 'electronic consent object' could easily be implemented in this type of infrastructure [26] .
United Kingdom
For over 15 years the UK Data Protection Act (1984) regulated the use of automatically processed information relating to individuals, and the conduct of services in receipt of such information [29, 30] . The Act required the registration of individuals and organizations, including National Health System (NHS) trusts and health authorities, who held personal information on computers, as well as bureaux that provided computer services to personal data users. It prescribed criminal penalties for failing to register and for acting beyond the scope of the registration. Crucially, it also allowed individuals to find out who held information on them and what the data contained as well as obliging organizations to disclose their activities.
These provisions were updated and extended by the Data Protection Act (1998), which was incorporated into UK law on 1 March 2000 to enact the requirements of the earlier
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(1995/98) European Directive on Data Protection [29] . The new Act extends data protection controls to certain manual as well as computerized records and strengthens the rights of individuals and the powers of the supervisory authority. The most fundamental differences between the 1984 and 1998 Acts, however, concern the change in the definitions of 'personal data' and 'processing'. The 1998 Act is limited to living people and data are only regarded as personal if they can be traced back to identifiable persons. The Act does not therefore cover anonymized data. Processing is defined more widely than the 1984 Act to cover any activity from collection to destruction as well as retention. Articles of the new Act deal with the transfer of personal data across national borders -an area of direct relevance to telemedicine.
Within this legal framework, the NHS is developing an electronic health environment incorporating nation-wide electronic health and patient records. Embarrassingly, the governmental ministry, the Department of Health (DH), has found that the NHS is not fully complying with the laws of patient confidentiality. The chief concern was that disclosure of personal information was taking place without the consent of the patient. The NHS therefore commissioned a project to investigate pathways to support consentbased use of patient information respecting the prevalent laws of confidentiality.
The project report [2] argues against an implied consent system, concluding that it is not possible for a subject to consent to a course of action without having sufficient information on the alternatives to or the consequences of that action. The report states that for implied consent to be valid, understanding or awareness of the disclosures of the patient's information, awareness of options to prevent such disclosures, and also a mechanism to stop the disclosure of information must be present in a health system.
Regarding explicit consent, the report also states that it is not financially feasible to implement such a system within the developing UK e-health infrastructure. It also would not provide proportionally more protection for personal information, could not guarantee coverage for the whole population of the UK, and would be a severe burden on the NHS as it would reduce resources available for the main services of public healthcare.
Their chief recommendations include making patients aware of the disclosures that their personal information is likely to undergo in an integrated e-health environment, supporting the concept of informed choice, namely the choice to 'opt out' of disclosing certain information, implementing explicit consent mechanisms for some risky areas of personal health information identified by the study, and introducing measures for enhancing confidentiality in the short term. Long-term goals include the restructuring of NHS data flows to conform to the laws of confidentiality, and legal and organizational changes.
The New Zealand health system and e-consent developments
The work described in this and the final section of the article outline an ongoing project to establish an integrated privacy, authentication and security framework (the PAS project) for New Zealand. Progress to date has surveyed international best practice in e-consent (see above) and carried out selected interviews with key healthcare personnel at national and operational levels to identify critical issues and make preliminary recommendations for the design of the framework. The overarching goal is to establish generically applicable features for PAS management before many of the new e-health projects begin to bear fruit.
Galpottage and Norris Patient consent principles
Before describing the results of the project so far it is helpful to summarize the main features of the New Zealand health system, since these may not be familiar to a wide audience and they significantly influence the direction of the project.
New Zealand is essentially a publicly financed health system with a few private sector providers operating at the high end of the market. Policy directives are formulated centrally by the Ministry of Health (MOH) and funding for the agreed services is delegated to district health boards (DHBs) which manage general practitioners in primary care (some of which is fee for service), secondary (hospital), tertiary (specialist) and community services. An unusual feature of national healthcare is the compensation granted to patients in the event of an accident by the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), which effectively curtails anyone from suing another person (including clinicians) for damages resulting from an accident in New Zealand.
Health data are collected by two national subentities of the MOH, the New Zealand Health Information Service and the Health Payments Agreement and Compliance Organization, by collating all data gathered by regional DHBs and storing and administering these data in large centralized databases. Information is released upon request to anyone with a justifiable purpose. The links between the various organizations are shown in Figure 1 .
New Zealand has gained a significant advantage in healthcare information management following the introduction of a National Health Index (NHI), which allocates a unique identifier to any healthcare consumer who obtains services from a healthcare provider. To anonymize personal health information, the NHI is encrypted when releasing health information to third parties not involved with the care of the patient. The NHI is used to link data in several national health databases to improve the planning, delivery and quality of care. The NHI is also the fulcrum of the national e-health strategy (the Working to Add Value to E-information or WAVE project) [31] launched in 2001.
The privacy of all individual information is governed by the Privacy Act 1993 [32] . This Act sets out 12 information privacy principles which are mandatory for all government [33] is based on the 12 principles in the 1993 Act, modified to address privacy issues in the health sector. This code is mandatory for all health entities in New Zealand. The Privacy Act 1993 has been successful in maintaining individual privacy of information held in organizations in New Zealand and has been a model for the Pacific region.
The New Zealand Health and Disability Commissioner's Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers Rights 1996 [34] codifies the requirement for consent and informed choice in New Zealand (rights 6 and 7). According to the code, every New Zealand healthcare consumer or disabled person has the right to make an informed choice as to what type of treatment he/she will get from the provider and to convey that choice to the healthcare provider using consent either verbally or on a paper-based form.
Even though this code recognizes the right to informed choice and consent, New Zealand healthcare providers assume that patients have given consent if they come to seek their services. They do not ask for the patient's approval to share his/her personal health information with third parties even if these third parties are not involved with the provision of care. This approach is validated by the HIPC and states that it is only necessary to obtain the patient's consent to share personal information if the healthcare provider or health agency cannot satisfy the conditions set out in information privacy rule 11, section 2. These conditions provide for release without consent if it is undesirable or impractical to obtain permission, the disclosure of personal health information is in accordance with the purpose(s) under which it was obtained, or the information is anonymized so that the patient cannot be identified. However, patient consent is recorded when performing surgery or conducting clinical trials.
The PAS project
The survey of international practice and initial discussions with MOH officials identified a checklist of questions that were directed at senior DHB executives, privacy officers and technical personnel. Answers were sought by face-to-face discussion and e-mail. The checklist contained 12 closed and open-ended questions and began with a question to determine if the participant routinely dealt with information that could be used to identify individuals. The remaining questions covered different scenarios dealing with issues such as the release of sensitive information related to diseases such as cancer and HIV, the process of informing the patient, the individual's capacity to consent, the frequency of consent denial, the means of disclosure, the location of consent requirements, arrangements with third-party organizations, and the ability of patients to update their own consent status. Further details are available elsewhere [35, 36] .
The survey was intended as exploratory, even tentative, to establish directions for more detailed work in which a draft framework could be constructed and presented for wider consideration including patients and other providers and consumers of healthcare. The results should be seen in this context. The questions and answers concentrated on how an e-consent system could integrate into New Zealand healthcare and what organizational and operational changes might be necessary to implement it.
Participants recognized the benefits of e-consent and the necessity of a generic PAS framework but expressed concerns about the costs of such systems compared with the benefits. They were clear that an e-consent system should benefit providers as well as Galpottage and Norris Patient consent principles consumers. Several interviewees felt that these benefits would only be apparent in the long term and, whatever format it took, an e-consent system would need to reduce administrative overhead by encompassing short-term specific consents with longer-term master agreements for longitudinal records. The accurate recording of exactly what a patient had consented to was seen as a major benefit of e-consent.
The more technically oriented contributors pointed to the need to develop such systems in accord with the recommendations of the WAVE strategy [31] , which advocates that 'all future communications in the health sector must be in electronic form'. This strategy underlines the thrust for integrated services and the importance of bandwidth and user access via existing standards (including security for storage and transmission), the national Health Intranet, and ubiquitous services such as e-mail, all of which have roles in an e-consent system. Related issues included technical support for e-consent, the role of digital certificates to authenticate and audit requests, and the scalability of solutions given that small healthcare organizations would need to communicate with much larger ones.
One of the major concerns in these interviews was the need for the ongoing education and training [26] needed to roll out and operate a PAS framework. A surprising finding was that privacy officers were generally unaware of the security features offered by information systems (and hence an e-consent system) and systems specialists had little concept of privacy issues. The requirement for provider education became self-evident even before the needs of consumers were considered. Responses to consumer education aspects focused on the process of ensuring that patients were adequately 'informed' whether the requirement applied to consent for medical treatment, clinical or statistical information sharing.
Some interesting issues surfaced around patient control of information and its availability to those directly involved in treatment and to third parties. The privacy officers interviewed believed that patients should have the ability to update their own consents online [4] but that the system would need to be very robust to avoid error. If New Zealand does move towards an e-consent system, the granularity of control of individual information within electronic information systems will prove to be a critical factor.
The privacy officers agreed with clinicians that patients would expect an electronic system to manage their consent agreements and that the system would automatically make these consents available to carers to ensure the continuity of care. New Zealand's reliance on implicit consent meant that patients would not in many circumstances be asked to release their information to third parties who had legitimate reason and authority to request it (e.g. for research purposes). There was a general assumption (to be tested in consumer interviews) that an e-consent system would not diminish patients' high level of trust of clinical judgement in these matters.
The topic of patient control over the release of information raised two other significant concerns. First, the study revealed the lack of a policy for the release of patientidentifiable information for medical follow-up studies and genetic research in New Zealand. This would be highly important in an epidemic situation as with the recent SARS outbreak in South East Asia. Without follow-up studies on identifiable individuals it would be difficult to keep track of disease progression in a geographic area, leading to ignorance of the level of threat posed by a pandemic. Therefore, it is crucial to have a policy at organizational level to release individual information in an emergency situation where normal e-consent rules would not safeguard the health and wellbeing of society. In this Health Informatics Journal 11 (1) regard, the method of ethically obtaining a waiver of consent by informing the public of the purpose for sharing health information during emergencies would provide guidance, as described by Shah and Sugarman [16] .
Second, a question arose over a projected organizational change and the definition of a third party. Like many developed countries, the New Zealand health system undergoes continual change to seek efficiencies in the face of rising costs and embattled budgets. One way to deal with such issues is to seek economies of scale by merging services and functions. The relevant example in New Zealand is the amalgamation of certain primary and secondary services into primary health organizations (PHOs) [37] . Previously, healthcare information held on an individual by one of the merged organizations would not necessarily be made available to another unless that organization participated in direct care or had some other legitimate reason for access. With the merger, however, the PHO as a single entity acquires its own legal status, and this raises the prospect that any member of the organization has a right to access the patient's information. This dilemma exists whatever the format, paper or electronic, of a consent system, but it is clearly necessary to resolve it when designing an e-consent system.
The PAS survey, although exploratory as indicated, elucidated a number of issues and principles related to the design and implementation of an e-consent framework in New Zealand. These issues and principles can be summarized in a set of recommendations as shown in Table 1 . The recommendations are divided into short-term and long-term timescales, reflecting the need for careful planning if the introduction of e-consent is to realize the potential benefits. These recommendations will serve as a starting point for the next phase of development of the e-consent system. Table 1 Recommendations for the design and introduction of an e-consent framework Short-term recommendations 1 Central strategic health organizations must engage in confidence building measures with consumers 2 Future e-health systems must be built with provisions for future interaction with an e-consent system 3 An e-consent system should be non-intrusive and utilize existing resources and practices 4 Any e-consent system must be fully scalable 5 Communication between healthcare provider and consumer must indicate that personal information will not be misused 6 Prevailing regulations and legislation must be fully complied with and their impact communicated to the consumer 7 Consumers should be able to access who has seen what of his/her personal information using audit trails 8 Consumers should be informed of any pathways to opt out of information disclosure and the resulting consequences 9 Systems should maintain an audit log of consumer and provider access to information Table 1 Continued Long-term recommendations 10 Funding, support services, personnel training and user education aspects with regards to e-consent must be considered 11 Integration into legacy systems and interoperation between future e-health portals must also be considered 12 The impact of digital signatures and certificates on e-consent systems needs to be analysed from a policy perspective 13 Have a policy for sharing personal health information for medical follow-up studies, genetic research and emergencies 14 Clear identification of third parties in all e-health transactions is needed to inform the patient 15 Decide the granularity of control of individual information within electronic information systems 16 E-consent systems should record whether the consumer was adequately informed of all choices and consequences 17 E-consent systems should verify that the patient has sufficient capacity to give consent and retained relevant information 18 A consumer should be able to grant a longitudinal consent with regard to his/her personal information 19 Consumers should be made responsible for the privacy and security of their own health information 20 A patient should be able to do so using common Internet/web browser technology to improve acceptability
